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How Shall the Constitution 
be Enforced?
A Preview of Minneci v. Pollard
By John F. Preis
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mericans love their Consti-
tution. A typical visit to 
Washington, D.C., might 
involve a trip to the 
National Air and Space Museum, a tour 
of the monuments on an amphibious 
bus and, quite strangely, veneration of a 
legal document. That’s right, Americans 
will stand in a long, snaking line out-
side the National Archives just to see, 
for a fleeting moment, their cherished 
Constitution. It’s enough to make the 
Restatement of Torts positively jealous. 
But perhaps the Restatement 
deserves a bit more respect. Tort law, 
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just like much of constitutional law, protects us from 
invasions of bodily integrity. If a government officer 
invades this integrity, maybe a tort action could provide 
the same relief as a civil rights action. Or maybe not.  
That is the question presented in Minneci v. Pollard, 
a case I argued before the United States Supreme Court 
this term. The plaintiff in Minneci, Richard Lee Pollard, 
suffered several Eighth Amendment violations while a 
federal prisoner in 2001. After accidentally breaking both 
his elbows, Pollard was denied adequate medical care, 
nutrition, and hygiene. Given these constitutional viola-
tions, Pollard did what many prisoners do: He brought a 
civil rights action in federal court seeking damages.  
Pollard’s suit did not proceed like an ordinary civil 
rights action, however. The district court dismissed 
Pollard’s suit because Pollard arguably had tort remedies 
under state law. Where common law remedies are avail-
able, the district court appeared to believe, there is no 
need to, as the saying goes, make a federal case out it. 
The district court’s opinion was an interpretation 
of the Supreme Court’s “Bivens doctrine.” In a series of 
decisions starting with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), the Court has defined the circumstances under 
which federal officers may be sued for constitutional 
damages. (Bivens concerns only the liability of federal 
officers; the liability of state officers is controlled by the 
well-known statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.)
Bivens actions are not popular with the modern 
Court. Time and again, the Court has turned away 
Bivens plaintiffs, usually with the observation that it is 
Congress, not the Court, that should be deciding who 
may sue federal officers. In some cases, the Court has 
gone so far as to suggest that a constitutional damages 
remedy is not necessary where a similar remedy could 
be had under state tort law. These scattered references 
to state law in the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence are 
what doomed Pollard’s suit in the district court.   
In May 2007, I came across the district court’s 
ruling in Pollard’s case. At the time, I was researching 
the value of state remedies in upholding constitutional 
norms and felt certain that the district court had made 
a mistake. I wrote Pollard and offered to represent 
him pro bono on appeal. He accepted and I quickly 
filed a notice of appeal. Three long years later, Pollard 
and I prevailed before the Ninth Circuit. Our victory 
was short-lived, however: This past May, the Supreme 
Court decided to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  
In Minneci, the Court will decide how, at least in 
some cases, the Constitution shall be enforced. The 
Court could decide, as Pollard and I contend, that con-
stitutional rights should be enforced through traditional 
civil rights actions. Or the Court could decide that tort 
law protects the same interests covered by constitutional 
law and that common law actions will therefore keep 
federal actors in line with constitutional norms.
The core of our argument before the Court is that 
tort law, though hypothetically applicable in the prison 
setting, lacks specific content as to prisoners’ rights. 
Take, for instance, one of Pollard’s Eighth Amendment 
claims—the deprivation of food and hygiene. To hold 
that tort law would provide Pollard and all other federal 
prisoners with relief, the Court would need to find that 
tort law in every state imposes a duty of care on jailers 
and that this duty encompasses obligations to provide 
adequate food and hygiene. It is of course possible that 
state common law might provide such relief, but the case 
law on this issue is sparse if not nonexistent—principally 
because constitutional rights have long been enforced on 
their own terms, not through the proxy of state tort law. 
Another problem with relying on state remedies to 
enforce constitutional rights is that state law will vary 
between states, and also vary over time within each state. 
The common law rights of prisoners in California will be 
different from prisoners in Florida, and the rights in both 
states will undoubtedly be different in the future than 
they are today. This variability makes state law a poor 
replacement for federal law, which by its very nature, is 
intended to be uniform across the entire country.
None of this is to suggest that states should not 
attempt to protect civil rights through their 
common law, or that federal prisoners ought 
not to press their common law actions. 
It is simply to say that the Constitution 
cherished by so many Americans is distinc-
tive both in its content and national reach. 
The Court should heed this in Minneci 
and hold that Pollard’s constitutional 
rights are enforceable without regard to 
the content of state law. n 
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